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How To Beat the Pretermitted
Heir Statute
By KxmT H. PYLEi*
THE decedent, aged six-ty-one, committed suicide on May 7, 1963,1
leaving a formal witnessed will executed forty days earlier.' The will
was admitted to probate. Various individual legatees were listed, and
the American Heart Association, Inc., was named residuary legatee.'
The will did not mention decedent's daughter by name, or even in-
dicate that she had a daughter, but declared:
FIFTH. Except as otherwise provided in this Will, I have intention-
ally and with full knowledge omitted to provide for my heirs, includ-
ing my son GARETH DESMOND WINTON. 4
The omitted daughter filed a petition to determine heirship.5 At
the trial, the attorney who drew the will testified that testatrix had
indicated to him that she was greatly disappointed in her family6 and
that she had been quite reluctant to mention her son in the will.7 He
further stated that when testatrix was asked at length whether she
had other children, she was very equivocal and reticent to. the point
of not speaking in response to the question for a minute or two.8 She
finally demed having other childrenY
A qualified psychiatrist testified that "Repression is the uncon-
* B.S., 1962, University of California; LL.B., 1965, Hastings College of the Law;
member, California Bar. The author acknowledges the assistance of Edward W Schrain
and Dale E. Hanst of the Santa Barbara Bar. The conclusions are the author's, and is
bias is that he helped to prepare the rejected petition for a hearing in the California
Supreme Court in Estate of Lipovsky, 238 Cal. App. 2d 604, 48 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1965),
petition for hearing dened, 64 A.C. Feb. 2 minutes at 9 (1966).
1 Clerk's Transcript, p. 13, Estate of Lipovsky, 238 Cal. App. 2d 604, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1965), petition for hearing dented, 64 A.C. Feb. 2 minutes at 9 (1966).
[Hereinafter cited as Clerk's Transcript.]
2 id. at 2.
3 Id. at 1-2.
4 Estate of Lipovsky, 238 Cal. App. 2d 604, 606, 48 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (1965).
5The petition was filed to institute a proceeding to determine heirship under Cal.
Prob. Code §§ 1080-82. The petition was in the usual form and notice was given as
required by law. Clerk's Transcript, pp. 5-6.
6 Reporter's Transcript, p. 12, Estate of Lipovsky, supra note 4.
7Id. at 14.
8 Id. at 15.
9 Izd.
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scious, unintentional covering or hiding, the putting back into the un-
known layers of the mind a desire, an urge, a feeling or a memory""
He stated that successful repression is a frequent phenomenon, 11 and
that it is not unusual for a parent to successfully repress memory of a
child in whom the parent is disappointed. 12 Further, the psychiatrist
testified, in substance, and in response to a hypothetical question, that
in his opinion it was medically probable that testatrix had successfully
repressed the knowledge of the existence of her daughter, and that
such repression would have the effect of eliminating from her mind
the knowledge that she had a daughter.'3
The residuary legatee appeared alone in opposition to the peti-
tion,14 presented no evidence, and objected to all the evidence pre-
sented by petitioner.
Petitioner's theory was that she came within the terms of Probate
Code section 90, the California pretermitted heir statute which
provides:
When a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children,
or for the issue of any deceased child . unless it appears from the
will that such omission was intentional, such child or such issue suc-
ceeds to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died
intestate.
The only reference in the will from which it could possibly appear
that the omission to provide for petitioner was intentional, as is re-
quired by the explicit language of the statute, is the reference in para-
graph FIFTH, quoted supra, to intentional omission of provision for
"heirs." Petitioner was neither named in the will nor described by the
more specific words "daughter," "children," or issue", only the word
"heirs" was used.'-
The trial court, after considering the extrinsic evidence outlined
'Old. at 22.
1" Id. at 25.
12 Id. at 26-27.
13 Id. at 30-31.
14 Clerk's Transcript, p. 15.
15 The clause used was adapted from a form clause recommended m pamphlets
on wills widely distributed by two Califorma banks. BANK oF A_ mucA, SUGGESTED Pno-
VISIONS Fon Wr.s A" TRusTS 21 (5th ed. 1964); SEcuriTY Frost NATIoNAL BANIJ,
FoRMs oF WmLs AN Thusis 15 (7th ed. 1962). The Bank of America form clause is
more specific, stating that testator has intentionally omitted to provide for his heirs
"including my children and the issue of any deceased child." BAix oF AmmucA, op. cit.
supra at 21. A nearly identical clause is set forth in CALIoRNA Co n~Mtr EDUCATION
oF = BAR, CAr Fomu WnLL DnAarnN §§ 7.28-.30, 19.16 (1965), but its use is not
recommended and naming children and issue of deceased children is said to be a better
method of complying with § 90.
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above, found as facts that petitioner was the daughter of decedent16
and that the omission of provision for petitioner in decedents will was
unintentional. 7 Judgment was entered for petitioner entitling her to
distribution of one-half of the estate.1 s
The district court of appeal reversed the judgment, concluding
that "as a matter of law" the language found in paragraph FIFTH of
the will indicated an intent on the part of the testatrix to omit pro-
vision for her daughter. 9 The court held that extrinsic evidence was
not admissible to prove testatrix's lack of intent to omit her daughter.
A petition for a hearing in the California Supreme Court was demed.20
Thus, to the extent that the opinion of a district court of appeal,
reinforced by a denial of a hearing in the supreme court, can be relied
upon as a correct statement of California law21 the way to beat the pre-
termitted heir statute is to insert after the dispositive clauses the
clause: "Except as otherwise provided in this will, I have intentionally
and with full knowledge omitted to provide for my heirs." This will
signify an intent to omit provision for any child or grandchild not
named in the will.22 No evidence to the contrary may be received.23
It is probably the safer course not to attempt an enumeration of the
intentionally omitted "heirs," lest the enumeration be incomplete, as
16 Clerk's Transcript, p. 45.
17 Ibtd
18 Id. at 45-46.
19 238 Cal. App. 2d at 610, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
20 64 A.C. Feb. 2 minutes at 9.
21 More petitions for hearings i the supreme court after decision by a district court
of appeal are denied than are granted, and the effect of a denial as settling the law is
difficult to determine. For an interesting attempt at analysis of the factors considered
by the court in granting or denying a hearing, see generally Note, To Hear or Not to
Hear: A Question for the Califorma Supreme Court (pts. 1-2), 3 STAw. L. Buy. 243
(1951), 4 STix. L. REv. 392 (1952). The grounds on which a disappointed litigant
may petition for a hearing in the supreme court after decision in the district court of
appeal are set forth M CAT onNm. Ruirs oF CoURT rule 29. The most important ground
is where a hearing in the supreme court appears necessary to secure uniformity of deci-
sion or the settlement of important questions of law. CaL.Fornu RuLEs oF Counry rule
29(a) (1).
22 Estate of Lipovsky, 238 Cal. App. 2d 604, 606-10, 48 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44-45
(1965).
23 Note that the exclusion of all extrinsic evidence would bar every clannant, no
matter how certain it was that his omission was unintentional or due to a mistaken belief
in the mind of the testator about his death. To use a familiar classroom case, the loved
son presumed dead in the war would now return from the prison camp to find that his
claim to a share in his deceased father's estate was absolutely barred by the presence
of a Lipovsky type clause in his father's will. A similar situation existed in Estate of
Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 352 P.2d 505 (1960).
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in Estate of Lpovsky,24 and raise some doubt as to the testator's in-
tent.25 Perhaps it is safest for the attorney not to even talk to the
testator about children or grandchildren, lest, if LDpovsky is overruled,
he is required to give testimony similar to that given by the draftsman
there.26
While tins appears to be the way to beat Probate Code section 90,
there is some doubt that the legislature intended it to be so, and some
hope that it will not remain so forever.
Lipovsky and Torregano
The district court of appeal in Lipovsky reached its holding by this
chain of reasoning. A testator can disinherit a child, although his in-
tention to do so must appear on the face of the will.27 It is not neces-
sary that the child be named in the will.28 It is enough that a class be
intentionally omitted that can include a child.29 It is settled that the
24238 Cal. App. 2d 604, 48 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1965). See text accompanying note 4
supra.
25 The doubt raised by an incomplete enumeration is expressed by the question:
if testator named some of the disinherited children, why did he not name the others? It
appears that an incomplete list of children, together with the fact of existence of un-
named children, gives rise to a latent ambiguity. And it is well settled law that extrinsic
evidence is admissible to resolve a latent ambiguity, Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d
234, 246, 352 P.2d 505, 512, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 144 (1960). This argument was ad-
vanced by petitioner in Lipovsky, but the district court of appeal dismissed the argu-
ment by stating that the clause was not internally inconsistent, which, if true, disposes
only of the patent ambiguity question. The court stated further that the failure to men-
tion petitioner by name did not dictate the conclusion that testatrix did not have her
in mind, which is irrelevant, as it is not necessary that the facts whch give rise to a
latent ambiguity dictate the resolution of that ambiguity. Estate of Lipovsky, 238 Cal.
App. 2d 604, 610-11, 48 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1965). Of course where there is a danger
that the enumeration might become partial due to the potential birth of children after
the execution of the will, the inclusion of a phrase indicating an intent to disinherit
afterborn children as a specifically described class would make it practically impossible
to claim or prove any ambiguity or any lack of intent to omit. This would be true even
if extrinsic evidence were admissible, as the presumption of intent to omit from such a
combined list and general clause would be very strong.
26 238 Cal. App. 2d at 608, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
2 7 Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 142 Pac. 838 (1914); Estate of Stevens, 83 Cal.
322, 23 Pac. 379 (1890).
28Van Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal. 2d 705, 299 P.2d 1 (1956); Estate of Kurtz, 190
Cal. 146, 210 Pac. 959 (1922). It should be noted that Van Strzen o. Jones, supra, as
well as other cases were said to have come before the courts under circumstances where
proof of lack of intent to omit was not offered. Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 254
n.9, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149 n.9, 352 P.2d 505, 517 n.9 (1960). Justice Spence, in his
dissent joined by Justices Schauer and McComb, was of the opinion that Torregano
could not be reconciled with Van Stnen. Id. at 254, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 149, 352 P.2d at
517 (dissenting opinion).
29 Van Strien v. Jones, supra note 28; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 168 Pac.
113 (1917); Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 142 Pac. 838 (1914).
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term "heirs" precisely describes children and issue of deceased chil-
dren.30 Therefore, the clause used is sufficient as a matter of law to
indicate an intent to exclude petitioner.
But in 1960, subsequent to all but one81 of the cases cited in sup-
port of this reasoning, the California Supreme Court decided Estate
of Torregano.12 In 1915 Torregano had been told under convincing
circumstances that his daughter was dead.33 His 1947 will stated, "I
am a widower and have no children, issue of my marriage ."34
and further stated
THIRTEENTH. I give, devise and bequeath to any person or per-
sons who may contest this my Last Will and Testament, or assert any
claim to share my estate by virtue of relationship or otherwise the
sum of One Dollar ($1.00) each in settlement of their said clai or
claims."5
The supreme court held that extrinsic evidence, in this case evidence
that showed testator mistakenly believed his daughter was dead, was
admissible to prove testator's lack of intent to omit from his will any
provision for a presumptive heir.36 The court determined that this
exact question had never been decided,3 7 although there were several
cases where such evidence had been allowed,38 and numerous cases
with dicta that such evidence would not be allowed.39 Furthermore,
it was found that the mistake which caused testator to omit provision
for his child could not possibly appear from the will, and therefore
extrinsic evidence must be contemplated by the statute.4 ° The court
distinguished cases cited by respondent for the proposition that appel-
lant was excluded from the estate as a matter of law by paragraph
Thirteenth on the grounds that the will, as a whole, indicated that
testator did not intend that the daughter be barred by the no contest
clause,41 and also that the case involved something more than a no
contest clause.42 The court concluded that more than the general lan-
30 Estate of Cochems, 112 Cal. App. 2d 634, 247 P.2d 131 (1952).
31 The one later case cited was Estate of McClure, 214 Cal. App. 2d 590, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1963), and the holding of that case was nusstated. See note 66 infra and
accompanymg text.
3254 Cal. 2d 234, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 352 P.2d 505 (1960).
331d. at 241-42, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 141, 352 P.2d at 509.
34 Id. at 239, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 352 P.2d at 507.
35 Ibid.
36 Id. at 243, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 142, 352 P.2d at 510.
37 Id. at 243-45, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43, 352 P.2d at 510-11.
38 Id. at 244, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 142, 352 P.2d at 510.
39 Id. at 244-45, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 143, 352 P.2d at 511.
40 Id. at 246, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 352 P.2d at 512.
41 Id. at 251-52, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48, 352 P.2d at 515-16.
42 Id. at 253-54, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 149, 352 P.2d at 517.
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guage found in paragraph Thirteenth should be required to exclude a
claim of pretermission by a daughter of whose existence the testator
was unaware and further, that the issue of pretermission was a ques-
tion of fact.43
The Ltpovsky court distinguished Torregano on the ground that
that case involved a no contest clause rather than a disinheritance
clause.44 This distinction furnished some support to the court in Lzpov-
sky, which, however, took no note of the fact that the Torregano
opinion also pointed out that some of the older cases were decided
under circumstances where proof of lack of intent was not offered.45
It should indeed require more than general language to conclu-
sively exclude a child from attempting to prove that he comes within
the operation of section 90. And it should require more than general
language whether such language appears in the form of a general dis-
inheritance clause, as in Lpovsky, or in the form of a general no con-
test clause, as in Torregano.
Torregano Should Be Extended
The Torregano decision, if it means anything, must mean that
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show unintentional omission where
there is some indication of intent to omit on the face of the will. This
is so because the court there must have recognized that there had
been some indication of intent to omit the daughter in the no contest
clause since, if there were none, it would not have appeared "from the
face of the will that such omission was intentional," and the pre-
termitted heir statute would have applied automatically, without any
extrinsic evidence of intention. "6 Proof of relationship alone would
have established petitioner's status as a pretermitted heir47 and it
would not have been necessary to hold that extrinsic evidence of inten-
tion was admissible.
Further, although the Torregano decision indicated that it could
not be determined as a matter of law that the no contest clause was
43 Id. at 254, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 149, 352 P.2d at 517.
44 Estate of Lipovsky, 238 Cal. App. 2d 604, 611, 48 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1965).
45 Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 254 n.9, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149 n.9, 352 P.2d
505, 517 n.9 (1960).
46 Plamtiff in Torregano introduced much evidence at the trial over the objection
of defendant to show that testator had not intended to omit her. The evidence is sum-
manzed in 54 Cal. 2d at 241-42, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 141, 352 P.2d at 509.
4 7 CAL. Nho3. CODE § 90 provides that a child, or issue of a deceased child, omitted
from a will (who has not received a settlement or an equal proportion by way of ad-
vancement) will succeed to its intestate share unless it appears from the will that the
omission was intentional. Thus a child will take unless there is some indication of in-
tentional omission on the face of the will.
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intended to apply to the daughter, 48 it Is clear from the plain words of
the clause, "I give . to any person who may assert any claim
to share in my estate by virtue of relationship the sum of One
Dollar,"49 that in the absence of the extrinsic evidence which was ad-
mitted, the clause could have been meant to apply to the daughter.
The words exactly described a class of which petitioner, as soon as she
claimed a share of the estate as a pretermitted heir, was a member. The
question, then, is no longer to be decided by reading the will and say-
mg either, yes, there is sufficient indication of intention to omit, or no,
there is not sufficient indication of intent to omit. In all but the clearest
cases-those in which it clearly and convincingly appears on the face
of the will that testator had the child min mind at the time of executing
the will and, having the child in mind, omitted to provide,50 or those
where there is no indication of intentional omission on the face of the
will-extrinsic evidence is admissible to show lack of intent to omit in
order to overcome any indication of intent to omit which does appear
on the face of the will."'
Thus Torregano should not be dismissed as a holding that a no con-
test clause is no indication of intent to omit. Rather, the logical exten-
sion of the rule of the case, though the opimon was cautiously limited
to the facts at hand, is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show
lack of intent to omit whenever there is some general phraseology on
the face of the will which shows intent to omit in a manner not suffi-
ciently strong and convincing. 2 The statements in Torregano differen-
tiating the general disinheritance clause cases from no contest clause
cases do not appear to have been determinative when one recognizes
that the evidence was held admissible against a clause which did show
some intent to omit. It is submitted that the presence of either type of
general phraseology, in light of Torregano, should give rise only to an
inference of intent to omit which is rebuttable by extrinsic evidence to
show lack of intent to omit.53
48 54 Cal. 2d at 252, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 148, 352 P.2d at 516.
49 Id. at 239, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 352 P.2d at 507.
50 That this is the requirement for intentional omission, see the cases cited in para-
graph "(10)" of the Torregano opinion, 54 Cal. 2d at 249, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 146, 352
P.2d at 514.
51 Extrinsic evidence of intent to omit is not admissible by the terms of the statute.
54 Cal. 2d at 247, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 146, 352 P.2d at 513.
52 The Torregano decision quoted Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288, 142 Pac.
838, 839 (1914), to the effect that a strong and convincing showing of intent to exclude
children must appear on the face of the will before their "natural nghts" to share in the
inheritance of their immediate ancestors shall be taken away. 54 Cal. 2d at 249, 5 Cal.
Rptr. at 146, 352 P.2d at 514.
53 In a note on Torregano, it was concluded: "A more plausible explanation is that
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The true issue in a pretermitted heir case is whether it appears on
the face of the will that testator had the child in mind at the time of
executing the will.-4 The purpose of the statute is to guard "against the
omission of lineal descendants by reason of oversight, accident, mis-
take, or unexpected change of condition.""' The court should thus
scrutinize the will to see how clearly and strongly the testator indi-
cated that he had Ins children inmind, not how clearly and strongly
he indicated an intent to disinherit a general class which could include
his children. In this connection one may note that a child named in a
will and not provided for cannot take as a pretermitted heir, even if
the will contains no disinheritance clause whatsoever."0
The importance of this observation is that it focuses attention on
the fact that the strength of a clause which is argued to show some
intent to omit a child is determined by the clarity and lack of ambi-
guity with which the clause refers to the child, and not by the form of
the clause, whether it is a disinheritance clause, a no contest clause,
or even a list of children. As a matter of common sense, the use of the
word "heirs" in a general disinheritance clause is no more an indication
that a testator had a particular child in mind than is the use of the
word "relations" in a general no contest clause. As pointed out above,
Torregano was a case of first impression. Many of the prior decisions
had been rendered without attempted proof of extrinsic circumstances
showing lack of intent to omit, and many of those- decisions must be
reevaluated in light of Torregano. It is not to be supposed that the use
of a general clause of disinheritance is no longer some evidence of
intent to omit children,57 but, where only a general class description
the court has overruled Fernstrom to the extent that general language such as 'heirs'
will no longer be sufficient as a matter of law to exclude a presumptive heir of whom
testator is unaware. A jury may still find that the testator would have disinherited the
child even if he had known of her existence; however, to disinherit such an omitted
child without allowing the admission of any extrinsic evidence, the language of the will
must show affirmatively that such a sweeping omission was actually the intent of the
testator. Language falling short of this, but which would have been sufficient to show
an intent to omit m the past, now would give rise to 'an inference of intent to omit pro-
vision for a presumptive heir,' rebuttable by extrinsic evidence." Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 476, 479 (1961). (Footnotes omitted.)
54 See Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 249, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 146, 352 P.2d
505, 514 (1960). Whether claimant has been provided for by way of settlement or ad-
vancement can of course be an issue under the California statute, but this is a separate
question.
5 Id. at 248, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 352 P.2d at 513.
56Estate of Fanning, 8 Cal. 2d 229, 64 P.2d 951 (1937); Estate of Sawyer, 193
Cal. App. 2d 471, 14 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1961); Estate of LaBne, 130 Cal. App. 2d 235,
278 P.2d 760 (1955).
U7 Indeed if this were true, the result would be that a man desiring to disinherit
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is relied upon to show intent to omit a particular child, logic and the
policy of the statute support the admission of extrinsic evidence of
the circumstances and the state of testator's mind to show lack of intent
to omit.58 The class description would create a presumption of an in-
tent to omit, the strength of which might logically vary with the degree
of specificity of the class description, 9 and the evidence of uninten-
tional onussion should be required to be strong enough to overcome
the presumption.
Torregano stated with reference to the general description situation
there:
Such general language, referring as it does to a large class of persons,
cannot be deemed, as a matter of law, necessarily to include a close
relative who the testator mistakenly thought dead.60
And the court continued with reference to general phraseology-
[T]he statement made m the Wilson opinon to the effect that specific
words of kinship must be interpreted in light of circumstances of
each individual case, and not by slavish adherence to the interpre-
tation placed upon the same words under a different state of facts, is
a correct statement of law
Mere general phraseology, standing alone, cannot be construed
to indicate an intent to omit provision for a presumptive heir, under
every possible circumstance, even if such phraseology includes the
word "heirs."61
In other words, general phraseology should not exclude as a matter of
law, under all circumstances, competent evidence which might prove
that testator was in fact unaware of the existence of a child.
Cases Since Torregano
Two cases decided since Torregano are helpful in determining the
extent of the rule of that case.
his children and grandchildren would have to name each one, as they were born, in a
codicil to his will, and specifically disinherit them. This result is neither likely nor
desirable.
58 Otherwise, the statute becomes a dead letter m the presence of the form clause
used m Lipovsky. The mistake or oversight which caused testator to omit the claimant
can never be proved from the face of the will. Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 246,
5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 144, 352 P.2d 505, 512 (1960).
59 For example a clause disinheriting "my children A and B, and any children
hereafter born to the mamage of my wife and myself, and any issue of any of my
children who predecease me" would -create a stronger presumption of intent to omit
those covered by the pretermitted heir statute than a clause disinheriting "my heirs.'
80 54 Cal. 2d at 248, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 352 P.2d 513.
61 Id. at 250-51, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 147, 352 P.2d at 515.
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In Estate of McClure6 the will did not mention testatri's grand-
daughter, but provided that if any person contested the will, claimed
to be an heir to any part of the estate, and successfully established the
fact, such person would receive one dollar.63 The trial court allowed
extrinsic evidence to be introduced by the granddaughter in support of
her clain of pretermission.6 4 The trial court found that the will ex-
pressed an intent to disinherit the claimant, and found against her. On
appeal, the court rejected claimant's contention that the finding of in-
tent to omit was erroneous as a matter of law 65 But the district court
of appeal did not hold or suggest that the admission of extnnsic evi-
dence to show lack of intent to omit was error. The conclusion was that
"absent any factors indicating a contrary conclusion," the language of
the will was a sufficient indication of intent to omit the granddaughter
to comply with the requirement of section 90.66 In addition, the court
pointed out that the intent expressed by a class designation may not
be the same in all instances and that the use of general language desig-
nating a class might or might not indicate the intent of a testator to
omit a particular individual, depending on the circumstances of each
individual case.67 It seems clear that the factors and circumstances in
an individual case can only be shown by extrinsic evidence.
A second case, Estate of Groscup,66 also involved a grandchild, the
son of a child who predeceased the testator. Neither the grandchild nor
is mother was mentioned in the will. The will did declare that except
as otherwise provided, the testator had intentionally omitted to pro-
vide for his heirs living at the time of his death.6 9 A summary judgment
against the grandchild petitioner was affirnmed on appeal. However, the
district court of appeal pointed out that the trial court had correctly
considered the facts alleged in petitioner's counter-affidavit in opposi-
tion to the motion for summary judgment before determining that
62214 Cal. App. 2d 590, 29 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1963).
63 Id. at 592, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
64 The evidence consisted of proof that petitioner had frequently visited testatrix
in the three years preceeding the execution of the will, which arguably was as much in
derogation of petitioner's contentions as in support thereof. Id. at 595, 29 Cal. Rptr. at
572.
05 Id. at 592, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
66Id. at 593-94, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 571. In Lipovsky, the district court of appeal
stated that McClure held the clause there involved referred to a child of the testator not
othernse provided for and thus satisfied § 90. This ignores the fact that this entire
"holding" was preceded and modified in the McClure holding by the phrase, "absent
any factors indicating a contrary result."
67 Id. at 593, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
68231 Cal. App. 2d 535, 42 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1964).
69 Id. at 536, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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there were no fact issues which required trial.7° The general language
of disinheritance in the will did not bar consideration of extrinsic evi-
dence to show lack of intent to omit. The court stated that Torregano
made it clear that extrinsic evidence was admissible at the instance of
the omitted heir to show that the omssion was unintentional, and that
the trial court correctly followed this rule in considering all the facts
alleged in petitioner's counter-affidavit. 71 If the affidavits raised any fact
issue, trial was required.7 2
Thus, while the Groscup court did not find sufficient facts presented
to raise a triable issue of fact, it did state that facts could be shown
by extrinsic evidence to rebut the inference of intentional omission
raised by a general disinheritance clause, a clause almost identical with
the one in Lipovsky. The summary judgment against petitioner af-
firmed in Groscup indicates one answer to those who oppose the exten-
sion of Torregano with the argument that evidence can be adduced in
every case to show that omission to provide was unmtentonal.73
The Legislative Intent
There is a legislative purpose behind section 90 which deserves to
be sustained. The Torregano decision stated it well: California, since
its origin as a state, has protected the spouse, children and grand-
children against unmtentonal omission from a testator's will. The
legislature's continuing policy of guarding against omission of lineal
descendants by oversight, accident, mistake or unexpected change of
condition is reflected in the statute designed to protect children against
omission which not infrequently arises from the peculiar circumstances
under which the will is executed.74 These peculiar circumstances in-
dude the fact that many wills are executed by aged persons, persons
who have often been long separated from their children or grandchil-
dren, persons who, in some instances, through lapse of memory or
70 Id. at 537, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
71 The facts alleged were that testator regarded his daughter, petitioner's mother,
very highly, knew of her death, was on friendly terms with petitioner, and that testator's
sight and hearing were failing at the time of execution of the will. Id. at 536, 42 Cal.
Rptr. at 21-22.
72 Id. at 537, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
7 8 In most cases the proof by petitioner, to be convincing, would probably have to
be along the lines that testator was unaware of petitioner's existence at the time of
execution of the will, and it is likely that such proof will seldom be available. Summary
judgments against petitioner can quickly dispose of those claims obviously without merit.
74 Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 248, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 145, 352 P.2d 505,
513 (1960); Estate of Kretschmer, 232 Cal. App. 2d 789, 794, 43 Cal. Rptr. 121, 125
(1965).
January, 1967] THIE PRETERMTTED HEIR STATUTE
mental conditions contributed to by age or otherwise, are not aware
of, or have temporarily forgotten, the existence of members of their
own family It seems that the policy of the statute is at least arguably
meritorious, and it is certainly not so clearly a bad law that it deserves
judicial repeal.
A Reasonable Rule
In conclusion, it appears that there is a sure way to beat the Cali-
fornia pretermitted heir statute if Lpovsky can be taken at full value.
But the general phrase of disinheritance which is held there to be con-
clusive, as a matter of law, as a showing of intent to omit a pretermit-
ted heir, does not, as a matter of common sense, indicate specifically
that the testator had any,particular individual in mind when executing
the will. It is true that in a will drafted by a lawyer, technical words
should be considered in a technical sense, 5 but to follow this to the
extreme of Lpovsky will result in the emasculation of section 90 by
the standardized use of the uninformative boiler plate language found
there. The situation will be precisely as it was described before Torre-
gano by Mr. Witkm:
[T]he pretermitted heir statute no longer fulfills its purpose. Its effect
is nullified by the standard form of disinheritance clause which every
careful attorney uses. The court, in Estate of Cochems recognizes
this defeat of the statutory policy in the following language: "[Tjhese
general clauses do not in fact constitute evidence that omitted
children or grandchildren were intentionally omitted quite the
contrary is true, for had they not been forgotten, they would generally
have been referred to at least by a class."76
The main argument in favor of the Lpovsky result is that it pro-
motes certainty While certainty is a goal perhaps more to be sought
in wills than in any other area of the law, it is achieved at considerable
cost when a statute is effectively nullified. The California legislature
has sought to protect the members of the pretermitted heir class from
unintentional omission, and this goal deserves judicial support.
It remains certain that mention by description as a part of a class
is some indication of intent to omit. Torregano recognized this, 77 but
also set forth the reasonable rule that extrinsic evidence to show lack
75 CAL. PnoB. CODE: § 105. But also "Strict adherence to the technical meaning of
words and phrases must give way, if inconsistent with the testator's intent as shown by
the will as a whole "Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 251, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137,
147, 352 P.2d 505, 515 (1960).
764 WrrmN, Summ~ny oF CALXwoRNu LAw 3028 (1960).
77 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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of intent to omit is admissible in the face of general words of omission
which name a class that includes the claimant. This seems a proper
result. All of the ordinary safeguards of the judicial process are avail-
able to detect false clamis based on such extrinsic evidence, but if
Lpovsky, rather than Torregano, is followed, section 90 will become
practically unavailable regardless of the merit of claimant's case.
If there is a necessity for a clause which will absolutely disinherit
persons within the pretermitted heir class, it is an easy matter to put
the question beyond a doubt by naming the persons in the will with a
nominal legacy or none at all, from which it will clearly appear that
these persons were in the mind of the testator. 78 Requirmg this much
to be certain before excluding extrinsic evidence has the advantage of
enforcing the policy of the statute by encouraging the scrivener to get
testator to reveal the names of all the potential pretermission claimants,
ensuring that testator does in fact knowingly omit them.
Where the claimant is only described by reference to a class in a
clause of omission, the door should be open to factual proof that the
claimant was unintentionally omitted, with the clause creating a pre-
sumption of intentional omission. If a general disinheritance clause or
a general no contest clause covering "children and children of deceased
children," "heirs," "issue," or "persons claiming my estate by virtue of
relationship," were placed m the will, under the reasonable rule there
would exist a presumption of intent to omit. This presumption might
logically be considered stronger the more closely the description in
the general omission clause matched the class of those who might take
under the pretermitted heir statute. And, as in Groscup,79 unless the
affidavits indicated that extrinsic evidence of lack of intent to omit
raised a triable issue of fact against the presumption, the general clause
would support a demal of claims of pretermission by summary judg-
ment. Where the extrinsic evidence indicates a lack of intent to omit,
it should be admissible against any type of general clause of omission,
and the issue of pretermission, should become a question of fact.
78 Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 252, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 148, 352 P.2d 505,
516 (1960); Estate of Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 330, 23 Pac. 379, 382 (1890).
O See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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